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The change of rule and reprisals against 
the Hungarians in Yugoslavia 
The Lakatos government in Hungary was considering the idea of forming a Serb 
defence force to help Hungary to retain Bafka (Bácska) and sent an emissary to 
the headquarters of Mihailovic to discuss the matter.1 Meanwhile, however, the 
Yugoslav partisans entered the Banate (Bánát) at the beginning of October, along 
with the Soviet army. Units of the Eighth Vojvodina Brigade transferred there 
from Srim (Szerémség) entered Bela Crkva (Fehértemplom) on 1 October and 
reached Vrsac (Versec) on the following day. On 16 October, the partisan high 
command moved there, including Tito. He had just reached an agreement with 
Stalin in Moscow, covering joint military operations of the Yugoslav and Soviet 
armies on Yugoslav soil. Under that agreement, Tito had received a requested 
tank division, an undertaking from the Soviets to quit the territory of Yugoslavia 
after the military operations, and permission for Yugoslav authorities to exercise 
1 Lajos Bolla, the Hungarian consul general in Belgrade, wrote in his report on 3 October 
1944, "An emissary of ours (a military man) tried recently to reach Mihailovic's head-
quarters. This happened just at the time when Tito's bands had made a successful 
strike on Mihailovic's headquarters in the Ravna Gora mountains. Our emissary told 
me that as a result of the attack, he failed to reach his desired destination and had to 
make a 35-km night-time journey through the pathless mountains, partly on foot. Fur-
thermore, he found himself in an extremely dangerous situation in a village near 
Gornji Milanovac, when Mihailovic's men began to act in a threatening way towards 
him, so that only after strong representations by him and the Mihailovic officer accom-
panying him could he continue his journey. He also told me that on the way, seven 
communist prisoners had their throats cut before his eyes." Finally, the consul general 
recommended that under the circumstances, they should not insist upon making direct 
contact with Mihailovic and his men. Magyar Országos Levéltár (National Archives of 
Hungary, henceforth: MOL). K-63. Küm. pol. 1944-16-119. 
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the functions of public administration during the Soviet stay.2 From Vrsac, Tito 
directed the liberation of the capital, Belgrade, as commander in chief. This ex-
tremely important operation included the introduction of military rule in the Ba-
nate and in Ba£ka and Baranja (Baranya), i.e. in all territories recovered from 
Hungary except the Medimurje (Murakoz) and the Mura Country. Tito justified 
this by "the extraordinary circumstances under which these territories lived 
during the occupation, and the need to remove as fast and fully as possible all 
misfortune caused to our people by the occupiers and the aliens settled here, 
while full mobilization of the economy for as successful a continuation as possi-
ble to the war of people's liberation requires initially that all power be in the 
hands of the army."3 Colonel General Ivan Rukovina was put in charge of the 
military administration. He stated plainly in a proclamation on 22 October that 
military rule was needed "to preserve the national future and the South Slav na-
ture of these territories." He went on to say that the Slav population had an obli-
gation to "help in the introduction of measures necessary from the point of view 
of the national future,"4 and warned of the toughest sanctions against acts of 
sabotage. Rukovina was directly subordinate to Tito. The only other place where 
military rule was introduced after the partisans took over was Kosovo, where 
there had been an armed uprising. 
Nikola Petrovic, a member of the Provincial Committee of the Communist 
Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ), reflected the view of many South Slavs when he called 
it a "historic decision" to introduce military rule. Writing in Slobodna Vojvodina, 
the organ of the Vojvodina People's Liberation Unity Front, Petrovic went on to 
say, "We have broken up, or rather, pushed westwards the conquering German 
and Hungarian hordes, but we have not yet rooted out the poisonous weeds they 
scattered... The aliens, in their tens and hundreds of thousands, who settled ter-
ritories where our forefathers cleared forests and drained marshes, creating the 
conditions for civilized life, still shoot from the darkness at our heroes and at 
Russian soldiers, and do everything to prevent normalization of the situation, 
preparing, in this difficult situation for us, for the right moment to stick a knife in 
our backs again... The people sense the need for this decisive measure and the 
need for energetic measures to safeguard the Yugoslav nature of the Banate, 
Baika and Baranja."5 
So there were several motives behind the introduction of military rule. Here, 
as in Kosovo, the positions of the new authorities were very weak, so that the 
readiness for action provided by military rule helped to eliminate even the mini-
mal possibility of restoring the Hungarian administration. Of course, there was 
no chance of this in any case. Budapest, it will be seen later, did not even raise the 
question of a border adjustment on ethnic grounds in the South Country. It was 
important for Tito's regime to prevent this, lest these territories become a focus 
2 E. A. Sajti, "Tito," in P. Polonyi, E. A. Sajti, Mao-Tito. Budapest 2000,267. 
3 J. B. Tito, Sabrana dela. Vol. 24. Belgrade 1984,96-97. 
4 Muzej Vojvodine arhivska zbirka (henceforth: MV AZ). PK KPJ za Vojvodinu. No. 18815. 
5 Slobodna Vojvodina (reprint edition), 28 October 1944. 
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for supporters of the emigré government in London or for royalists, on the pre-
text of the Tito-Subasié agreement concluded under pressure from the Allies, 
notably Britain.6 
The Yugoslav military administration placed the organizations of people's 
power under strict military control. In some villages inhabited by Hungarians, 
Germans or Romanians, minority members were expressly forbidden to set up 
people's committees, whereas in general, there was pressure to establish rapidly 
a Slav-led police force (or People's Guard, as it was called at the time). Minority 
members were also forbidden to travel, move about in any way, or even use their 
language. Germans and Hungarians set to do forced labour in Stari Beéej 
(Óbecse) had to wear a white armband, so that they could be checked more easily. 
Although the ideological framework was different, the Yugoslav military ad-
ministration was brought in for very much the same reasons as the Hungarian 
one introduced in 1941. The purpose was to remove any doubts about where the 
territory belonged, on national (South Slav national) grounds, and to take indis-
putable control of every branch of authority and administration. Tito issued a de-
cree harnessing the largely undamaged economic potential of the territory to the 
war effort. However, the new possessors of power made that criterion subordi-
nate to ethnic policy, by interning and deporting members of the German and 
Hungarian communities, so that seasonal labour had to be brought from places as 
distant as Macedonia. 
The military administration was divided into two regions, the Banate and 
Badka-Baranja, each subdivided under district and local commands. The Banate 
and Baika were each divided into four military districts, while Baranja formed 
a single district. The seats of the districts were Petrovaradin (Pétervárad), Velika 
Kikinda (Nagykikinda), Panievo (Pancsova) and Vrsac in the Banate, and Novi 
Sad (Újvidék), Subotica (Szabadka), Sombor (Zombor) and Stari Beiej in Backa. 
There were seven departments in the executive branch and the judiciary. Ad-
ministrative, legal, statistical and personal matters, for instance, belonged to the 
General Department, while the Military Administration Department covered 
mobilization, labour service and labour camps. There were separate departments 
for legal and judicial work, the economy, transport, health, and public education.7 
There were doubts from the outset about the loyalty of the German and Hungar-
ian minorities to the new state. Yugoslavia, like several other countries in Europe, 
openly declared the collective responsibility of the Germans for the events of the 
war, while the Hungarians were categorized in a subtler way. ("Not all Hungari-
6 R. Koncár, Vojna uprava za Banat, Backu i Baranju 1944/1945. Zbornik radova sa naucnog 
skupa Narodna vlast u Vojvodini 1941-1945. Novi Sad 1986, 738. 
7 On the military administration, see Koncíar, op. cit.; R. Cvejic, "Uloga KPJ u organizo-
vanju i radu Vojne uprave za Banat, Baéku i Baranju," Istrazivanja 1 (1971), 245-255; 
A. Kasas, "Ekonomske mere Vojne uprave za Banat, Baíku i Baranju 1944/1945," Zbornik 
za istoriju Matice srpske series 27 (1983), 173-183; N. Lazic, Baranja 1941-1945. Slavonski 
Brod 1979, 252-259; E. A. Sajti, Délvidék 1941-1944 [South Country, 1941-1944] Buda-
pest 1987, 243-248. 
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ans are responsible for the crimes of Szalasi and Horthy.") However, the line of 
"paying back everything" in revenge and collective responsibility was the domi-
nant one in the early months. 
The internment of the Germans and confiscation of all their property was offi-
cially ordered on 18 October 1944. Forty internment camps were established in 
Vojvodina, into which the data known today suggest that 140,000 Germans were 
crowded. These were almost exclusively women, children and old people. (It has 
been seen already that the men were conscripted into or volunteered for the SS 
and some of the population had left the country with the German troops.) Two 
days later, on 20 October 1944, the internment of Hungarians began. It is almost 
impossible to establish how many Hungarians were interned, as the literature 
available does not even give approximate figures. Knowledge of their fate as in-
dividuals, however, has grown substantially since the 1990s, mainly through 
reminiscences. Humiliated and exploited, they were put to work mainly in agri-
culture and timber production. This was done although they had not had any 
hand in the atrocities against the Serbs. For those that had were executed, or in 
the case of the Hungarian inhabitants of Curug (Csurog) and Mosorin (Mozsor) 
in the Sajkas (Sajkas) district, collectively expelled at the request of the local Slavs, 
because so many of them had assisted in the 1942 raid. The order to intern and 
relocate the £urug Hungarians8 came from the Vojvodina committee investigat-
ing war crimes on 23 January 1945 - after Rukovina's order on 1 December for the 
release of Hungarian internees deemed to be innocent. The reason given was that 
the whole adult Hungarian population of Curug had taken part "directly or indi-
rectly" in the bloody events of 1942. As the document put it, the relocation was 
necessary "to ensure the normal course of life in the village and punish justly 
those who had taken part in the assaults during the occupation." The statement 
on the subject in Slobodna Vojvodina on 26 January 1945 emphasized that the de-
portees were Hungarians, but the move was not aimed at all Hungarians. It was a 
punishment for those who had "committed crimes by their evil-doings." A simi-
lar fate befell the 550 Hungarian inhabitants of Mosorin and in fact almost all the 
Hungarians in the Sajkas district along the River Tisza. Most of them were taken 
8 For recent work on the reprisals, see M. Matuska, A megtorlás napjai. [Days of Reprisal] 
Novi Sad 1991; Miért? Zakaj? Lendavski zvezki/Lendvai füzetek series, no. 16. eds. 
S. Kulcar et al. Lendava 1998; L. Forró, Jelöletlen tömegsírok Magyarkanizsán, Martonoson 
és Adorjánon [Unmarked Graves at Kanjiza, Martonos and Adorján] Szeged 1995; 
S. Mészáros, Holttá nyilvánítva. [Declared Dead] Novi Sad 1991; T. Cseres, Vérbosszú 
a Bácskában. [Vendetta in Baika] Budapest 1991; B. Teleki, Becse történetéből. [From the 
History of Beiej] Becej 1995; E. A. Sajti, "Magyarok a Vajdaságban 1944 őszén" [Hun-
garians in Vojvodina in Autumn 1944] in Nemzettudat, jugoszlávizmus, magyarság. 
Szeged 1991, 123-131; Zs. Cirkl, Bácskai golgota. [Bacíka Golgotha] Totovo Selo 1998; 
I. Papp, Ez a mi kálváriánk. [This is our Calvary] Novi Sad 1999; J. Szloboda, Zentán történt 
44-ben. [It Happened in Senta in '44] Novi Sad 1997; J. Teleki, Visszatekintés a múltba. 
[Looking Back into the Past] Novi Sad 1996; Earlier, similar writings could appear only 
in the United States or Europe. See E. Homonnay, Atrocities Committed by Tito's Com-
munist Partisans in Occupied Southern Hungary. Cleveland Oh. 1957. 
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to the internment camps at Baiki Jarak (Jarek), Gajdobra (Szepliget) and Mlade-
novo (Dunabokeny). The ghastliest situation developed at Baiki Jarak, where 
various infectious diseases and poor provisions led to a very high mortality rate. 
At least 3,000 German internees died there, including about 400 children. The 
adult Hungarians of Curug and Zabalj (Zsablya) were marched to Baiki Jarak, 
while the children and women were taken by train and lorry. In the spring of 
1945, there were 3632 Hungarians at Baiki Jarak, which gained notoriety as the 
death camp and was closed in June 1945.9 At the same time, the first Slav settlers 
arrived in the village, which had once been almost entirely German in popula-
tion. 
The most tragic events after the change of rule in the South Country were the 
indiscriminate executions, mass murders and "still colder days."10 Instead of be-
ing followed by official investigations, these became shrouded in a silence im-
posed by the political authorities. The historiography of the question is interest-
ing in itself, not least as a typical example of how authority can mask its crimes in 
euphemisms. Here let us try to reconstruct one aspect of this-the sources and at-
tributions on which the published estimates of the number of victims have been 
based and how much researchers have managed to discover so far. However, 
there are some remarks to make beforehand. The resistance and civil war that 
preceded the Tito system and provided its legitimacy brought with it a psychol-
ogy of terror and counter-terror not alien to the revenge culture that is socially 
acceptable in the Balkans. The new authorities, and. Tito himself, toyed with the 
principle of "the worse the better", in terms of strengthening the partisan move-
ment. Many of his writings in this period show that he saw acts of terror against 
the Serbs, wherever they occurred, as events that played into the partisans' hands 
and could be used to further the communist movement. The new elite had 
a feeling, not to be underrated, that they had "suffered" to gain power. They and 
all those who had suffered for the new system were the only ones who had 
a right to exact revenge and receive compensation for their sacrifices. The concept 
of collaborators, traitors and fascists was not a legal one, but a political one, 
which could be extended indefinitely and had received moral and political rein-
forcement internationally from the trials of war criminals conducted by the Allies. 
In foreign-policy terms, there were no factors forcing the system to investigate 
itself and face facts that had been at work on Hungary after January 1942. There 
were desires for domestic political consolidation, but these were sufficient only to 
9 S. Mészáros, "A járeki haláltábor" [Baőki larak Death Camp] in B. Csorba, ed., S nem tö-
rődtek vele, a holnap mit őröl. [And They Paid No Heed to What the Morrow Brings] For-
rások a Délvidék történetéhez 3, Budapest 1999,204. 
10 The expression "cold days" entered the vocabulary of the Hungarian public and 
historians from the title of a gruelling novel by Tibor Cseres. The "cold days" covered 
the mass murders and razzias by the Hungarian soldiery and gendarmerie in January 
1942, when Serbs and Jews were shot and fell into the icy waters of the Danube. The 
"still colder days" refer to the way the partisans shot more Hungarians dead in re-
venge than the Hungarians had killed during the razzias. 
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ensure that the crimes committed against the Hungarians were classed as minor 
political "mistakes" that could be overruled and remedied, and were simply 
a "political error" on the part of a young, new system. 
The author considers that in terms of politics and power, the new system, for 
rational reasons, should not have allowed official and popular revenge to be 
taken on such a scale. It was done nonetheless, although efforts were made to en-
sure that the reprisals did not become a destabilizing influence. Tito himself 
treated the reprisals issue according to strictly political criteria. They were di-
rected not at a specific nation or national group, but against all who were collabo-
rators according to the philosophy of the victors and of whom it was thought that 
they might endanger the socio-political structure of the new system. Between the 
"good" and the "bad" was drawn an ideological, political dividing line, and eve-
ryone who had not "taken to the woods" with the partisans was called to ac-
count. 
That at most provided a cover for the ethnic forces behind the call to account, 
without changing them. Tito, in the autumn and winter of 1944-1945, handled in 
a masterly fashion the reprisals and the "fraternity and unity" that were seen as 
the foundation stone of the system. For instance, when the British followed the 
valid agreement by handing over to the Yugoslav army the domobran (Croatian 
enlisted men) who had surrendered at Bleiburg, as well as the Ustasa and other 
Croatian refugees, the regime proceeded to execute tens of thousands of prison-
ers of war and civilians. According to the official order signed by Tito, they were 
to be handled as prisoners of war, but he sent a messenger ordering that they 
should be executed just the same. Similar retribution was exacted near Kocevski 
Rog on Slovenian enlisted soldiers and fleeing civilians, and that is not to men-
tion what was done in Kosovo. 
The military administration carried a penal function. Before Tito arrived in 
Vrsec, he ordered Peko Dapievic, commander of the First Army, to send him 
a "reliable" brigade "to clear the town of its Swabian [local German] population."11 
The reprisals were largely carried out by state-security units of the People's 
Defence Department or OZNA (Odeljenje za zastitu naroda),12 but regular partisan 
units also took part. In many cases, the local population simply settled scores 
with its enemies. The reprisals were therefore carried out mainly by the new or-
ganizations of power and military force, but paradoxically, it was the rudimen-
tary, rootless condition of these that led to the uncontrolled escalation in the scale 
of their actions. It is now known that Tito also had knowledge of the executions 
in the South Country, while the internments and deportations were ordered by 
the military administrative bodies themselves. The OZNA received authority for 
its cleansing operations from the commander in chief. According to the recollec-
» Sajti, "Tito", 272-274; M. Dzelbdzic, ed., Tito u Vrsacu. Vrsac 1984, XIX. 
12 OZNA was formed in September 1943 as part of the High Command. Its aim originally 
was to build up an intelligence-gathering service to identify and punish spies and fifth 
columnists. Headed by Aleksandar Rankovic, it was the forerunner of the State Secu-
rity Directorate (UDB). 
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tions, the punishment of the people of Curug and Zabalj was authorized by Tito 
himself when a delegation applied to him. However, Tito feared there would be 
international outrage at the scale of the reprisals and called before him the lead-
ers of the Provincial Committee of the KPJ, Zarko Atanaskovic, its secretary, and 
Isa Jovanovi<f, its organizing secretary. According to the recollections of the latter, 
Stari ("Old One", the name used for Tito in tightly knit, high-ranking political 
circles) was angry because he was afraid of international complications and 
claimed they had known nothing about the reprisals. In self-justification, Jovano-
vic added, "These were done by individual commanders, mainly local people, 
often at the instigation of activists. The military administration had no knowl-
edge of these excesses either."13 A state commission was set up in May 1945 to in-
vestigate the "injustices" committed in Vojvodina. However, the records of the 
commission's work have never been found, if it ever began to operate at all. 
For many years, historians were obliged to rely on word-of-mouth estimates, 
until the collection of reminiscences and archival research began in present-day 
Yugoslavia. The latter have been confined so far almost entirely to the archive 
materials in Vojvodina and in Hungary. The materials in the Belgrade archives 
remain largely unknown, while exploration of the military archives has only just 
begun. Furthermore, it has to be realized that for a system of administration 
working by "partisan" methods, without any antecedents, the least of its con-
cerns is to record its own atrocities in writing. So it is not certain that the records 
in the military archives will bring us any nearer to accurate figures for the vic-
tims. The author takes the view that local historical research is likely to come 
nearest to the truth. So far it has been possible to find in historical writings and 
journalism figures that show discrepancies of several hundred per cent. Some put 
the number of victims at 5,000 and others at 40,000. 
The tribunal on war crimes (Komisija za utvrdivanje ratnih zlocina okupatora i nji-
hovih pomogaca) sentenced altogether 899 Vojvodina Hungarians to death for war 
crimes. Present knowledge suggests that about 5,000 people of Hungarian eth-
nicity were convicted of war crimes in judicial trials according to the laws of the 
time, but most of them were sentenced to forced labour or prison.14 The OZNA 
kept a special list of those executed in many places. The sentences were passed 
without a formal trial, based on "announcement" or perhaps on a list of Arrow-
Cross party members that had been found, or because someone had actually or 
presumably taken part in a raid. Many people were executed for having been 
members of the Hungarian Party of Renewal, or because they had held office 
during the years of Hungarian rule. In some cases, it was even enough to have 
been an elementary-school teacher who taught national awareness to his or her 
pupils, served as a Levente youth-movement leader, and so on. Surviving OZNA 
is I. Jovanovic, U sluzbi revolucije. Novi Sad 1987,198-199. 
14 The number of Hungarians executed as war criminals appears, on the basis of research 
by Sándor Mészáros, in Matuska, 373; A. Kasas, Madari u Vojvodini 1941-1946. [Hun-
garians in Vojvodinal Novi Sad 1996, 203. gives a figure of 5,000 for the number of 
Hungarians prosecuted for war crimes. 
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lists prove that mass executions took place mainly between late October and No-
vember 1944. 
The main sources explored so far by historians in Yugoslavia are a list com-
piled by the Vojvodina OZNA entitled "Register of Executed War Criminals 
1944/45" and notes of the names of those executed kept by some local people's 
committees. These show plainly that 5,000 Hungarians in Backa and the Banate 
were executed in October and November 1944. Those executed in Baranja, the 
Medumurje and Mura district are not included in the total. Nor are those exe-
cuted after sentencing by the Yugoslavian people's courts. The figure of 5,000 
covers only those executed whose names can be reconstructed from the two types 
of list mentioned and only those executed by the OZNA. Yugoslav Hungarian 
historical, and still more, journalistic accounts of the reprisals often cite a conver-
sation between the historian Sándor Mészáros, who died a few years ago, and 
Svetozar Kostic Capo, head of the Vojvodina provincial OZNA at the time of the 
executions. He thought that the OZNA forces had executed 20,000 Hungarians.15 
The first reports of the atrocities by the partisans occupying the South Country 
reached Budapest almost immediately, at the end of August 1944, while the 
Lakatos government was still in power. The information came from the already 
disintegrating gendarmerie in the South Country, or more precisely the Medi-
murje, and from Iván Nagy, a member of Parliament. 
Nagy passed on to the Prime Minister's Office a moving letter dated 7 August 
1944 from Rózsi Lajkó of Cakovec (Csáktornya, in the Mura district), in which she 
told her brother in the Backa village of Doroslovo (Doroszló) of their father's 
death. The partisans, on 23 July 1944, had rounded up 68 people, of whom six 
were Serbs, nine Dalmatians and the rest Hungarians. "Ten of these they tied to-
gether in front of the community and announced that they were taking them be-
fore the military law, and the rest of the youngsters would be [sent] under arms 
into battle." Since some of the men they sought were not at home, they threat-
ened the women, including the writer of the letter, saying that if the young men 
are not at home next time, they will take the women out for execution. The men 
collected were driven out to the edge of the village, to a marshy area, and there 
"they had to sing and they beat and stabbed them, shot them dead and pushed 
them tied together into the bushes, and those that were still alive choked like 
that... There were no other dead except these older men, but we don't know why 
it had to be done like that. Dear brother, we are orphans now, our good father is 
no more, there is mourning in our hearts..."16 
The Central Investigation Command of the gendarmerie reported on the same 
events on 19 August. According to this account, a partisan detachment of 50 men 
had burst into Cakovec, rounded up 53 prosperous Hungarians and taken away 
15 These sources were unearthed by the Novi Sad historian Aleksandar Kasas, who also 
published the victims' names. Kasas, 160-178. 
" MOL. K-28. ME Kisebbségi osztály. [Prime Minister's Office, Minorities Department] 
1944-R-25965. The letter was written in a strong dialect and with spelling mistakes. 
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their horses and agricultural implements. Their relatives had found the bodies of 
37 victims in a wood a few kilometres from the village.17 
The provisional Hungarian government in Debrecen certainly knew about the 
atrocities a few weeks after its formation. Its earliest known report on the subject, 
compiled in Debrecen on 16 January 1945, deals with the Petőfi Brigade formed 
by the partisans. These source materials of 1945-46 also contain estimates of the 
number of victims, which have found their way into the public mind in Hungary 
through various channels. The anonymous author of the January 16 report had 
escaped into Hungary from Baika. According to his report, "The fate of the Hun-
garians in the first weeks of the occupation was forced labour (men born 1883-
1929 and plenty of women as well), large-scale slaughter in more serious cases 
(see the ensuing report), and possibly financial (robbery) and moral ruin (viola-
tion of Hungarian women)."18 By the end of July, the Foreign Ministry had also 
received a list of Catholic priests killed or imprisoned by the partisans. It con-
tained the names of 22 persons, of whom 13 were known for certain to have been 
murdered, including Bálint Dupp, the parish priest of Curug, István Virág, titular 
abbot of Horgos (Horgos), the parish priests Dénes Szabó of Totovo Selo (Tót-
falu), Lajos Varga of Mol (Mohol), Ferenc Petrányi of Stari Beéej, Ferenc Plank of 
Stari Sivac (Ószivác), István Köves of Mosorin, Antal Berger of Tavankut (Ta-
vankút) and Dr Ferenc Takács of Baíko Petrovo Selo (Péterréve), as well as Father 
Krizosztom Körözstös, Franciscan prior of Novi Sad, and another, unnamed 
Franciscan friar.19 These names are also likely to have reached the government 
through Prince-Primate József Mindszenty, as did the account of the atrocities 
compiled by Hungarian refugees from the South Country, which Mindszenty 
passed to Foreign Minister János Gyöngyösi on 17 July 1946.20 (One of the authors 
had escaped from the Novi Sad internment camp.) Historians record how Mind-
szenty condemned resettlement of the Hungarian community in Slovakia, in 
a dramatically worded pastoral letter on 15 October 1945, but with the Hungarians 
in Yugoslavia, he thought it enough to pass on news to the government. The re-
port put the number of victims at 50,000-60,000. Special mention was made of the 
Jarak camp, where the authors said that 80 people a day were dying. They also 
counted 16 priests of Kalocsa diocese among the victims. A report prepared by 
the Foreign Ministry on 16 October 1945 for the peace preparations put the num-
ber of dead at 40,000, while another memorandum, made for Prime Minister Fe-
17 Ibid. 
18 MOL. A nemzeti kormány miniszterelnökségének iratai [Documents of the Prime Minister's 
Office of the national government). 1944/1945-1949. XIX-A-H-XXIII-112-1945. 21.d. 
Unfortunately, the supplementary report mentioned was not found. 
19 MOL. Külügyminisztérium Békeelőkészítő osztály iratai [Documents of the Foreign Minis-
try Peace Preparations Committee] XIX-J-1 -a-IV-l09-40178/ Bé-1945. 55.d. Later re-
search established that the unknown Franciscan was called Kristóf Kovács. Péter Wei-
ner, parish priest of Baíka Palanka (Palánka), died in internment camp and Endre 
Varga, parish priest of Toba (Tóba), during interrogation. M. Matuska, "Vajdaság már-
tír papjai," [Martyr Priests of Vojvodina] in Csorba, S nem törődtök vele, 219-21. 
20 MOL. XIX-J-1-a-IV-109-1981 /Bé-1946. 55.d. 
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renc Nagy on October 20,1946, gave a figure of 30,000-35,000. József Horváth, 
a lawyer from Backa who fled to Szeged, wrote in a letter to Gyöngyösi of some 
30,000 victims. A member of the Peace Preparations Department at the Prime 
Minister's Office, in a document at the end of November 1945, stated that there 
were "apparently" 20,000 Hungarian victims. The Minorities Department at the 
Prime Minister's Office, in one of the peace preparations materials made in the 
autumn of 1949 about Yugoslavia, contains this formula: "According to unverifi-
able reports, the number of Hungarians executed in Vojvodina was about 40,000. 
The closure of the Yugoslav border and the insurmountable obstacles to travel to 
Yugoslavia make it impossible to gain an insight into this question."21 
So the estimates that reached the Hungarian government from various sources 
ranged from 60,000 down to 20,000. The figure that became most established in 
Hungary was the 40,000 mentioned by Tibor Cseres, based on data from two 
Catholic priests, Márton Szűcs and József Kovács. It seems likely, therefore, that 
Mindszenty and Cseres drew on the same sources. 
Dezső Sulyok, formerly a Smallholders Party member of Parliament, did not 
give a figure in the memoirs he wrote from exile, but he had hard words for the 
slaughter perpetrated by the "revenge brigades". József Grősz, archbishop of 
Kalocsa, who received accounts from priests in his diocese who had fled, wrote in 
his diary of revenge and the large number of victims. The writer Gyula Illyés re-
corded in his diary on 27 May 1945 that 30,000 Hungarians had been murdered in 
the South Country, while on 5 June he mentioned a figure of 40,000.22 
These estimates made immediately after the executions have not been quoted 
out of any conviction that they bring the figures any closer to the truth. The im-
portant point here is that the Hungarian government knew of the mass retribu-
tion from the outset, even if the figures reaching them were not accurate. Despite 
that, there is no sign that the government raised the question of the mass execu-
tions anywhere - not with the Allied Control Commission, not separately in Mos-
cow, nor at the Paris peace negotiations, let alone in Belgrade. 
The only informal protest of which the author knows was made by Mátyás 
Rákosi, leader of the Hungarian Communist Party, on a secret visit to Vojvodina 
in January 1945, when he met Vojvodina provincial leaders and apparently even 
Tito himself. Rákosi, who was actually born in the Baőka village of Ada, met the 
secretary of the KPJ Provincial Committee, Jovan Veselinov Zarkov. Veselinov 
recalled the meeting in his memoirs, although he no longer remembered the exact 
21 Ibid. IV-104-jugoszláv-40.171 /Bé-1945. 54.d.; IV-109-495/Bé-1946. 55.d; IV-110-
40862/Bé-1945. 55.d; MOL. Miniszterelnökség Kisebbségi és nemzetiségi osztályának iratai 
[Documents of the Prime Minister's Office Minorities and National Groups Depart-
ment]), 1945-8. XIX-A-l-n-"Z"3045/1946. 6.d. 
22 Cseres, 242-247. For critiques of these calculations, see E. A. Sajti, "Döbbenet és hiteles-
ség," [Dismay and Credibility] Magyar Napló, Vol. Ill, No. 12, 4 October 1991, 36-38; 
D. Sulyok, A magyar tragédia. [Hungarian Tragedy] Part 1, Private edition, 1945, 156-
157; J. Török, ed., Grősz érsek naplója 1944-1946 [Diary of Archbishop Grősz, 1944-1946] 
Budapest n.d., 56; Gy. Illyés, Naplójegyzetek 1929-1945. [Diary Notes, 1929-1945] Buda-
pest 1986, 364, 366. 
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date. Rákosi, apparently, had told him he approved of what the Yugoslav com-
munists had done "with Horthy's men and the war criminals", for they had done 
the same with all traitors, but he requested that the mass executions and depor-
tations be suspended.23 
Careful study of the sources reveals how the reprisals lost significance at gov-
ernment level-in the Minorities Department of the Prime Minister's Office and 
especially in the Foreign Ministry. Eventually, official documents managed to 
turn the massacres by the partisans into something that had never happened. The 
process ended in 1946 with an image of Yugoslavia as a country that was resolv-
ing the nationality question in an exemplary way. This image was shattered not 
by evidence of the national and minority problems there, but by the Stalin-Tito 
split and the clash with the Soviet Union. One fruitful subject to investigate 
would be why the subject of the reprisals against the Hungarians never emerged 
in 1948-54, the tensest period in relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet 
bloc. 
The Minorities Department had been among the most important at the Prime 
Minister's Office before 1945, but then it began to decline, despite the fact that it 
had the extra task of contributing to the peace preparations.24 It has been seen in 
earlier how the Minorities Department held the reins in the affairs of the Hun-
garians beyond the country's borders. That also meant that the department could 
shape the policy of successive Hungarian governments based on a broad range of 
information. During the coalition period after 1945, the minorities issue became 
a theatre of party political struggles and demarcation disputes, especially between 
the communist-influenced Interior Ministry and the Prime Minister's Office. As 
the question of Hungarians abroad lost significance at government level, so the 
Minorities Department diminished in importance and produced ever more mun-
dane preparatory and analytical materials. Ödön Pásint, the head of the depart-
ment, commented bitterly on the reductions in the department after the Paris 
Peace Treaty had been concluded, in a memorandum to Prime Minister Ferenc 
Nagy in July 1946. The best specialist officers in the department had been lost and 
the staff reductions left it unable to do its job. Meanwhile "the situation of the 
Hungarian community in neighbouring countries has changed greatly for the 
worse, on the one hand. On the other, the complete absence of minority legal 
protection at present, and its possible introduction into the peace treaties, set very 
weighty and urgent tasks, whose neglect or inadequate performance could have 
the gravest and perhaps irreparable effects on the lives and livelihoods of over 
three million Hungarians."25 
23 J. Veselinov, Az autonóm Vajdaság születése. [The Making of Autonomous Vojvodinal 
Novi Sad 1984, 74. 
24 According to statistics compiled in June 1946 by Ödön Pásint, head of department, 
seven of the 14 executive officers, including the South Slav officer, György Borsay-
Bauer, were black-listed, i.e. dismissed as politically unreliable. MOL. X I X - A - l - n -
"Z"2748-1946. 5.d. 
25 Tbid. 
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The Minorities Department's hitherto central sphere of competence connected 
with the prime minister was broken up among several ministries. Almost every 
ministry set up its own minorities department, and eventually, in 1947, the de-
partment at the Prime Minister's Office was abolished. 
When Hungary signed the armistice in Moscow on 20 January 1945 and the 
Hungarian state formally began its post-1945 history, the country and its 
neighbours were placed in the Soviet sphere of influence. That placed heavy con-
straints on the country's sovereignty, not of course for the first time in its history. 
However, the disjunction of its ethnic and linguistic borders from its political 
ones remained as it had been since Trianon. The armistice already prescribed that 
Hungary had to withdraw its forces to its pre-1938 borders and all Hungarian 
laws and decrees ceased to apply to the territories reannexed between 1938 and 
1941. However, a quite different complexion was put on the failure to obtain 
a revision of the country's borders than the one current before the war. The Small-
holders' Party hoped that the linguistic and political borders would be brought 
closer to each other and that this would be augmented by autonomy for islands 
of Hungarians further from the border. The communists and the social democrats 
rejected any form of linguistically or ethnically based territorial revision and at-
tributed no significance either to minority protection based on collective rights. 
They viewed the problem of the Hungarian community as a question of democ-
racy (or people's democracy), assuming a kind of automatic adjustment. (They 
amended this stance in the case of Transylvania.) The political parties became in-
volved in serious debates during the peace preparations, mainly about the Hun-
garian-Slovak border, but they agreed from the outset that it was superfluous and 
senseless to put forward any territorial claims on Yugoslavia. Agreement was 
reached at a meeting of the parties on 6 March, 1946, held in the Minorities De-
partment of the Prime Minister's Office, which as mentioned before, was taking 
part in compiling the materials for the peace preparations. It had been agreed 
earlier that the question of the Hungarians of Yugoslavia could be taken off the 
agenda, as their situation was developing in a "fortunate" way. This was all the 
more the case because "the Hungarian mission in Belgrade, envisaged at the Pots-
dam Conference, will bring the two countries close together, so that we will be 
bound by the most cordial relations in terms of nationality policy as well."26 Gov-
ernment work concerning the situation of the South-Country Hungarians altered 
direction accordingly. A lengthy study entitled "The Development and Events in 
the Yugoslav-Hungarian Relationship since the Autumn of 1944" was completed 
on 28 December 1944 by the Minorities Department at the Prime Minister's Of-
fice. The study explained, "The forces of the Yugoslav army liberated Backa in 
the autumn of 1944 and the majority of the Hungarians had moved out along 
with the retreating Hungarian troops. Those who had spend years in the moun-
tains and forests returned to Baika. These people judged the Hungarians by a dif-
ferent yardstick and saw the events of 1941 as excesses committed by the old 
Hungarian army. Thus very few people were called to account for them. 
26 MOL. XIX-A-1 -j-"Z"252-l945. 3.d. 
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"As people's rule became settled in Yugoslavia, the Hungarian community re-
ceived representation in central power proportionate to its size. The Hungarian 
schools opened and the Hungarians found themselves in a more favourable 
situation than they had dared to imagine."27 The study took it as the standard, 
general view among the Baika Hungarians that "if the Chetniks instead of the 
partisans had happened to prevail, no sign of the Hungarian community would 
have survived in Baika today."28 
If no word was said about the executions, Foreign Minister János Gyöngyösi 
at least raised the question of ending the internments when he met Colonel 
Obrad Cicmil, head of the Yugoslav mission at the Allied Control Commission. 
Cicmil called on Gyöngyösi in his office on 17 September 1945 to enquire about 
the Hungarian position on the Yugoslav territorial claims against Italy. Gyön-
gyösi avoided giving a direct reply, whereupon Cicmil informed him that the 
Yugoslavs would be prepared to make Hungary the biggest concessions on port 
use and transit traffic. He added that "the Yugoslav government, for its part, is 
prepared to support Hungary at the peace negotiations and in the preparation of 
the peace, and apart from that, on any question that does not conflict with Yugo-
slavia's interests." Gyöngyösi requested that the Yugoslavs release not only Hun-
garian prisoners of war, but also the civilian Hungarian internees who are not 
war criminals." Cicmil gave a promise on this, without thinking it worth men-
tioning to the Hungarian foreign minister that reviews of the cases of internees 
had commenced several months earlier.29 
Among the few protests over the retribution against the Hungarians con-
cerned the case of 42 Szekler settlers who had been taken prisoner by the Yugo-
slavs, and whom historians until recently thought had simply been shot. György 
Bodor, on behalf of the Central Cooperative of Völgység Settlers (Völgységi Telepe-
sek Központi Szövetkezete) appealed to the prime minister on 7 December 1945 
to intervene with the Yugoslav allied mission, on behalf of the 42 men from 
Veternik (Hadikliget), who had been caught while fleeing from Baika. According 
to the documents, they were not allowed to go to Hungary even in September 
1946. Six of them had died in the meantime in the internment camp at the Bor 
copper mine.30 
Marshal Tito issued a decree on 27 January 1945 instructing the military ad-
ministration in Vojvodina to hand over to civilian people's committees by 15 Feb-
ruary. The explanation given was that the military administration had fulfilled its 
task and thereafter "would only obstruct the revolutionary changes in such a sen-
sitive multiethnic territory as Vojvodina." 
27 MOL. XIX-A-1 -n-"Z"79-l945.3.d. 
28 MOL. XIX-J-l-a-IV-108-71/Bé-1946. 
29 MOL. XIX-J-l-j-Jug-29/h-5.pol.-1945.38.d. 
30 MOL. XIX-A-1-n-"Z"1011-1945; A-j-XXIII-10817-1946. 2.d. Cseres, 235-236 followed 
the reminiscences of a Hadikliget Székely, Gábor Albert, in stating that the 42 men had 
been executed in Subotica. This was taken over by Kasas, 175. 
126 
THE CHANGE OF RULE AND REPRISALS AGAINST THE HUNGARIANS IN YUGOSLAVIA 1 9 4 4 - 1 9 4 6 
The matter was put more clearly in Slobodna Vojvodina, the one daily paper 
appearing in Vojvodina at the time. The military administration, it explained, had 
"basically resolved the German question in Vojvodina, while the Hungarian anti-
fascists have accepted that their place is in the people's liberation movement 
headed by Comrade Tito."31 
So the main condition for acceptance set by the new authorities was not loy-
alty to the state, but ideological and political identification with the system, al-
though the aim of the two was the same. Either way, every regime, in a period 
when the national question was handled largely as a border issue, sought guar-
antees that the minorities would not tend to gravitate outwards, towards the 
mother country. That was the case in Vojvodina as well, especially in wartime 
Europe, in a country that had just regained its statehood after being forced to its 
knees not long before. 
Initially, up to the end of the war, Tito offered only one way to prove loyalty 
to the state: volunteering for the partisan brigade named after Sándor Petőfi, the 
Hungarian poet. During the decades after 1945, the history of the brigade became 
a cardinal point in the process of legitimizing the Vojvodina Hungarian commu-
nity within the Yugoslav system, which meant that its history was falsified. The 
actual course of events is more prosaic, but no less instructive. The brigade was 
formed along with Albanian, Italian, German and Czechoslovak units in August 
1943 after a political decision, as a way of fleshing out the pan-Yugoslav character 
of the partisan movement. The Petőfi Brigade was founded in the small village of 
Slavonski Drenovac in the Slavonian mountains of Croatia, its members being 
transferred from various other partisan units fighting in the district at the time. It 
had a strength of about 80, of whom some 60 were Hungarians. Ferenc Kis was 
appointed commander and Károly Gerő political commissar. The language of 
command was Hungarian and the partisans wore next to the Red Star badge in 
their caps a strip of cloth in the Hungarian national colours of red, white and 
green. According to a report by Ferenc Marosy, the Hungarian minister in Za-
greb, a Hungarian flag was obtained from the Hungarian Public Education Asso-
ciation in Croatia during a raid, as the unit did not possess one.32 The brigade 
was supposed to become a focus for South-Country Hungarians joining to the 
partisan side, and even for anti-fascist and anti-German forces in Hungary, but it 
did not meet expectations in this respect. István Varga, a Hungarian communist 
and veteran of the Spanish Civil War, proposed at Baéka Topola (Bácstopolya) at 
the beginning of November 1944, during the period of the great reprisals, that 
volunteer Hungarian partisan units should also be formed in Backa.33 The recruit-
ing was relatively successful mainly among the poorer Hungarian peasants in 
31 Slobodna Vojvodina, 1 February 1945. 
32 MOL. K-28. ME Kisebbségi o. 1943-R-30933. 
33 On the history of the Petőfi Brigade, see F. Baki, L. Vebel, Petőfi brigád. [Petőfi Brigade] 
Novi Sad 1983; K. Brindza, Nemirna ravnica. Stara Moravica 1968; I. Törköly, Akikért 
nem szólt a harang. Vajdasági magyar frontharcosok vallomása. [For Whom the Bell Did Not 
Toll. Confessions of Vojvodina Hungarian Frontline Fighters] Szabadka 2001. 
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Bácstopolya and Stara Moravica (Ómoravica), although the district party organi-
zation put effort into ensuring that "class-conscious" individuals enrolled in the 
brigade. This armed unit was also preferred by several hundred Hungarians 
called up for labour service. On the whole, the Hungarian units were poorly 
equipped, although that was not specific to them. So the Sándor Petőfi Partisan 
Brigade consisted of a few volunteers and otherwise of Hungarians who practi-
cally speaking had been enlisted. They also crossed the border into Hungary (in 
the Danube-Tisza region and in Pécs and district, for instance) to perform propa-
ganda tasks. They saw action in the clashes along the River Drava (Dráva), 
mainly from February 1945 onwards. Their fighting morale was low and deser-
tions occurred. Their greatest test came in heavy combat near Bolman (Bolmány), 
where more than 30,000 Yugoslav soldiers lost their lives in several months of 
fighting against the German-Hungarian and Croatian armies, including many 
members of the Petőfi Brigade. Fierce German resistance was met during the bat-
tle for Bolman, where the Petőfi Brigade, now with a strength of about 1,200, suf-
fered 50 dead and 190 wounded in a single day on 6 March. 
A report was made about the Petőfi Brigade to the provisional Hungarian 
government in Debrecen on 16 January 1945. Its author was probably a man who 
had fled from Baőka having previously held a public position there. About the 
ostensibly voluntary nature of the brigade, he had this to say: "They either enlist 
"voluntarily" or are handled as fascist suspects and sent to do the forced labour 
obligatory for the South-Country Hungarian community." The brigade com-
mander, speaking at Sombor to the author of the report, during the early stages of 
organization, said that in a week and a half in command, he had managed to 
solve somehow the question of quarters and provisioning. "So far we have not 
received any other equipment than footwear. The four or five weapons available 
were obtained from Russians for spirits, etc." Interestingly, the author of the re-
port told the provisional government that although he realized the borders 
would follow the 1938 frontiers, he recommended somehow basing such a South-
Country Hungarian unit "on a footing of purely and exclusively Hungarian 
popular action", to demonstrate how Hungarian people there had put up armed 
resistance to fascism. That, he went on, would prevent Tito's people using the lo-
cal Hungarians for their own purposes.34 This idea was no more apposite than the 
earlier plan of recruiting a Serb defence force among the Baika Serbs. 
The grounds for bringing war criminals to justice was provided by an agree-
ment between the great powers. Proceedings would to take place in the country 
where the crimes had been committed. Hungary was obliged to hand over its war 
criminals by Point 14 of its armistice agreement. Yugoslavia applied for extradi-
tion mainly in the cases of those responsible for the Novi Sad and Sajkas raids, 
but there was also a list of several Hungarian politicians that originally included 
Horthy and Bárdossy. The Yugoslavs chased up the extradition proceedings on 
several occasions, complaining that the Hungarian government was slow to hand 
people over. For instance, Captain Lazar Brankov, holding talks mainly on school 
34 MOL. XIX-A-l-j-XXIII-112-1945. 21.d. 
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matters with the Minorities Department of the Prime Minister's Office on 25 Oc-
tober 1945, plainly reproached the Hungarian government for "taking a very bu-
reaucratic position" on the extradition question.35 
It is not widely known that the Hungarian government, when formulating its 
own peace objectives, considered holding a retrial of those responsible for the 
Novi Sad raid, or working up the trial materials from 1943-44 for foreign propa-
ganda purposes and publishing them as a book. The idea of a retrial was appar-
ently raised by Szabad Nép, the communist daily paper, early in July 1945, as 
a way of "showing the whole world that [the forces of] democracy in Hungary do 
not identify themselves with the Novi Sad affair." The retrial would also show, 
according to the paper, that it was the affair of the Germans, not the Hungarians. 
After the idea had been raised in the newspaper, it was also discussed by the Mi-
norities Department, which supported it, arguing that it would be "better for 
Hungary to come up" with the whole affair, which would "certainly be one of the 
most discussed propaganda questions" at the peace conference.36 An opinion was 
also requested from István Ries, the Social Democratic justice minister, who sent 
a reply on 16 August 1945. He supported the idea of publishing a popular ac-
count of the military trial and indicated that he would soon select someone for 
the task. Ries wrote to the prime minister, "I think it is in Hungary's interest to 
make the trial material ... known to the world public and show that retribution 
for the massacres in Novi Sad and district and restoration of the country's good 
name before world opinion was an aim also of the last administration, and only 
the mounting German political influence and the exigencies after 19 March 1944 
prevented the criminals from receiving their deserved punishment." However, 
Ries thought that a retrial could not be considered because of Hungary's extradi-
tion obligations under the armistice. For it might give the impression in Yugosla-
via "that Hungary wanted to withdraw the criminals from the jurisdiction of the 
Yugoslav people's court, which was competent according to the place of com-
mitment of the crimes."37 With that, the idea was dropped from the agenda. 
In May 1945, members of the Yugoslav interior security organization OZNA, 
with the help of the Soviet army, rounded up 36 Serbs and Croats taking refuge 
in Budapest and took them straight to Belgrade, along with members of the Ne-
dic party arrested in Vienna. They included journalists, former employees of the 
Croatian legation, traders and others. 
However, OZNA agents had already appeared in ruined Budapest at the be-
ginning of March 1945, intent on arresting a list of Hungarian war criminals, with 
the help of the Soviet mission to the Allied Control Commission. They discov-
ered, for instance, that Iván Nagy, the former head of the Hungarian mission in 
Zagreb and member of the Hungarian Parliament, who had finished his political 
career in the propaganda department of the Arrow-Cross government, was in 
hiding around Lake Balaton. Gyula Kramer, former president of the South-
35 MOL. XIX-A-l-n-"Z"813/biz-1945. 2.d. 
36 MOL. XIX-A-l-j-XXIII/b-5011-1945. 31.d. 
37 Ibid. 
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Country Hungarian Public Education Association, was arrested in Budapest, and 
Elemér Korányi, a Catholic priest and former member of Parliament, in Eszter-
gom. Leó Deák, for instance, gave himself up to the Soviet military authorities in 
Budapest on 11 March. The OZNA also caught in Budapest Milan L. Popovic, the 
former member of Parliament, Gyula Zombory, the Novi Sad chief of police, the 
gendarme Lieutenant Colonel Géza Báthory, József Könyöky, the Novi Sad police 
counsellor, and others. Colonel General Ferenc Feketehalmy-Czeydner, József 
Grassy and Márton Zöldi, for instance, arrived at the Andrássy Avenue jail in 
Budapest after being handed to the Soviets by the Americans. Following an ap-
plication by the Yugoslav mission to the Allied Control Commission, the latter of-
ficially requested their extradition from Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy, on the 
grounds that they had already been declared war criminals in Yugoslavia. Al-
though they had already been sentenced to death in Hungary, they were then 
extradited to Yugoslavia and put on trial again. With Ferenc Szombathely, the 
former chief of staff, a life sentence of penal servitude from the Hungarian peo-
ple's court was followed by extradition to the authorities in Yugoslavia, in Au-
gust 1946 under still unexplained circumstances, not long after he had begun to 
serve his sentence.38 
The first big war-crimes trial of Hungarian politicians, police and civilian offi-
cials started in Novi Sad on 20 October 1945. The main accused were Leó Deák, 
the former lord lieutenant, Milan L. Popovic, Gyula Kramer, Géza Báthory, Gyula 
Zombory, József Tallián, József Könyöki and Péter Knézi. They were all sen-
tenced to death by the military court of the Third Army, apart from Knézi, who 
was prosecuted because he had been an administrator appointed over Serb com-
panies. The sentences were carried out in Zabalj and Novi Sad. 
The deciding factors in all the war-crimes trials were the confessions of the ac-
cused and the testimony of the witnesses. Popovic, for instance, was interrogated 
for nine days, as was Deák for a similar period. None of them admitted to the 
main charge of taking an active part in the raid and reprisals, which were the war 
crimes, so that the cases had to rest on the testimony of the witnesses. 
The trial of Ferenc Szombathelyi and accomplices, which began on 22 October 
1946, raised considerable interest in Yugoslavia. The sentences were delivered on 
30 October or according to other sources, on 31. The accused alongside Szom-
bathelyi were Lieutenant General Ferenc Feketehalmy-Czeydner, Major General 
József Grassy, Gendarme Lieutenant General Lajos Gál, Gendarme Captain Már-
ton Zöldi, Ernő Bajsai, deputy lord lieutenant of Baíka, Miklós Nagy, former 
mayor of Novi Sad, Ferenc Bajor, city commander of Novi Sad, and Pál Perepat-
ics, former merchant and intelligence officer. Their trial was also used for political 
purposes before the parliamentary elections in the Serbian Republic.39 According 
to the charges, Szombathelyi was sentenced to death because he was responsible, 
38 Ibid. XXIII/b-3227-1946. 73.d; Szombathelyi Ferenc visszaemlékezése 1945. [Recollections 
by Ferenc Szombathelyi, 19451 Introduced and annotated by P. Gosztonyi, Budapest 
1990,15. 
39 MOL. Mikrofilm 12405/4; Slobodna Vojvodina, 24-31 October 1946; Kasas, 207. 
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as commander in chief of the Hungarian army allied with the Germans, for the 
murders and robberies committed by the advancing Hungarian army, and for the 
many death sentences by the chief of staff's so-called flying court, which had 
been designed to strangle the people's liberation movement and instrumental in 
organizing the raids. Szombathelyi in particular was accused, in the case of the 
judgements by the summary chief of staff's courts, of "not exercising" his pre-
rogatives of mercy, for instance in not reprieving Svetozar Markovic Toza, the 
Vojvodina communist leader. An ethnic Hungarian, Károly Gyetvai, was ap-
pointed as the prosecutor in the trial, for political reasons. According to the Vo-
jvodina press, "a storm of applause broke out" among the audience in court 
when the death sentences were pronounced, along with cries of "Long live the 
people's court, long live justice, death to war criminals" etc.40 Feketehalmy-
Czeydner, Grassy and Zöldi were sentenced to be hanged in public and the oth-
ers to be shot by firing squad in public and have their whole estates confiscated. 
Feketehalmy-Czeydner's sentence was carried out on November 4 in Zabalj and 
those of the others on the same day in Novi Sad. 
40 Slobodna Vojvodina. 5 November 1946. It is still not known how many death and other 
sentences the Yugoslav people's courts passed. 
